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When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The
Economics of Pleading and Summary Judgment
Standards
Keith N. Hylton *

This paper applies a simple economic framework to the
choice between pleadingand summary judgment as points
at which a claim can be dismissed. It concludes generally
that pleading standardsshould vary with the evidentiary
demands of the associatedlegal standardsand the social
costs of litigation.The common law's imposition of higher
pleading standardsfor fraud claims is consistent with this
proposition. The theory implies that the rigorous summary
judgment standardsthat have been developed by antitrust
courts should lead to a correspondinglyrigorous assessment
at the pleadingstage.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Pleading is the term lawyers apply to the claims plaintiffs assert
when they enter court, and the specific language used to assert them.
As every law student quickly learns, pleading under the common
law was a high-stakes game. Under the common law writ system,
a legal action began when the plaintiff obtained a writ ordering the
defendant to appear and defend himself.1 A plaintiff could lose if he
*

Professor of Law, Boston University, knhylton@bu.edu. Jon Baker, Bob Bone, Rich-

ard Epstein, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiaci, Bob Hahn, and workshop participants at AEIBrookings, University of Amsterdam, and New York University provided helpful
comments. I thank Boston University and Verizon for financial support. I am solely
responsible for the views expressed, as well as errors and omissions.
'See, for example, Benjamin J. Shipman, Handbook of Common-Law Pleading
17-18 (Harry Winthrop Ballantine, ed, 3d ed 1923) ("The original writ was a mandatory letter or executive order from the king to his officer, the sheriff, to compel the
defendant to appear in court to answer the demand of the plaintiff"); see also Jack H.
© 2008 by the University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0-226-64596-7/2008/0016-0002$10.00
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chose the wrong writ, and each writ had its own pleading requirements.'
In the latter half of the 1800s, courts in England and in the United
States began to reform the pleading process in an effort to simplify the
requirements.3 The reforms aimed to make the pleadings serve the4
functions of providing notice to defendants and guidance to courts.
The simplified pleading requirements were designed to make legal
judgments turn on the underlying merits of the case rather than the
skill of lawyers in satisfying arcane pleading rules.'
There are opposing views today on the degree to which courts
should use pleading requirements to police the types of claims
allowed to enter courts. One view holds that for pleadings to serve
the purpose of guiding courts and providing notice, courts need to
rigorously enforce pleading rules in order to bar claims that fail to
meet them. 6 The opposing view argues that the pleading rules should

Friedenthal, Mary Kay Kane and Arthur R. Miller, Civil Procedure 252 (Thomson/
West 4th ed 2005).
2
Maitland notes that each writ or form of action had a particular procedure, which
he refers to as a "procedural pigeon-hole," including a "particular mode of pleading."
Frederic Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law 3 (A.H. Chaytor and W.J.
Whitaker, eds 1936). As such, "[e]ach procedural pigeon-hole contain[ed] its own rules
of substantive law" but "it [was] quite possible that a litigant [would] find that his case
[would] fit some two or three of these pigeon-holes." Maitland, The Forms of Action
at Common Law at 3 (cited in note 2). If this was the case the litigant was forced to
choose a single writ, but he could "make a bad choice, fail in his action, and take such
comfort as he can from the hints of the judges that another form of action might have
been more successful." Maitland, The Formsof Action at Common Law at 3-4 (cited in
note 2); see also Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller, Civil Procedureat 252 (cited in note 1).
3Maitland notes several key changes to the writ system, including the Common
Law Procedure Act of 1852, which provided that it was no longer necessary to mention
any form or cause of action in any writ of summons, and the Judicature Act of 1873,
which was the most crucial change as it abolished completely the forms of actions
and provided that equity and law should be administered concurrently. Maitland,
The Forms of Action at Common Law at 7 (cited in note 2); see also R. Ross Perry,
Common-Law Pleading:Its History and Principles2 (Little, Brown, & Co 1897) (noting that the Common-Law Procedure Act of 1852 abolished the common law forms of
actions in favor of "the simplest possible statements of causes of demand"); Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller, Civil Procedureat 252 (cited in note 1).
4
Charles Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last PhaseUnderlying Philosophy Embodied in Some of the Basic Provision of the New Procedure, 23 ABA J 976 (1937) (discussing the reasoning behind the reformation of pleadings); Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller, Civil Procedureat 252 (cited in note 1).
'Clark, 23 ABA J at 976-77 (cited in note 4); Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller, Civil
Procedureat 252 (cited in note 1).
6
James Alger Fee, The Lost Horizon in Pleading Under the FederalRules of Civil
Procedure,48 Colum L Rev 491 (1948) (arguing that pleading rules should be strictly

Keith N. Hylton

41

not be used to bar many claims because there are other devices that
as pretrial discovery, pretrial conference,
can serve this purpose; such
7
and summary judgment.

The paper presents an economic analysis of the choice between
using pleading rules and other devices to screen claims.8 Specifically,
I will focus on the choice between the pleading stage and summary
judgment stage as points at which a claim can be dismissed.9 The
analysis shows that dismissal rules enhance the average quality or
merit of lawsuits, which in turn enhances incentives to comply with
the law. Thus, early dismissals, by eliminating low-merit claims
before they become costly, offer benefits to society in comparison to
late dismissals. I will apply the results of the analysis to the law on
pleading standards.
The results suggest a positive economic theory of the common
law on pleading standards and a normative theory for the developing
antitrust pleading standards. In general, pleading standards should
vary with the evidentiary demands of the associated legal standards
and the social costs of litigation. 10 This explains why the common
law imposed higher pleading requirements for certain claims-e.g.,

enforced to prevent litigation of issues that the parties did not intend to raise); see also
Friedenthal,
Kane, and Miller, Civil Procedureat 255 (cited in note 1).
7
James A. Pike and John W. Willis, The New Federal Deposition-DiscoveryProcedure, 38 Colum L Rev 1179 (1938) (discussing federal discovery and depositions
procedures and how such procedures relate to notice pleading); see also Friedenthal,
Kane, and Miller, Civil Procedureat 255 (cited in note 1).
'For a general discussion of the economics of pleading standards, see Robert G.
Bone, Civil Procedure:The Economics of Civil Procedure 125-57 (Foundation Press
2003). There is a related literature on the allocation of burdens of proof, see Bruce L.
Hay and Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation:An Economic Perspective, 25 J Legal Stud 413 (1997). While this paper addresses in a general way the setting
of optimal proof burdens, it does not address the allocation of proof burdens.
9Typically, defendants challenge cases at the pleading stage by filing a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. The summary judgment motion typically occurs
later in the litigation process and often challenges not only the sufficiency of the
allegations but also the existence of factual support for the allegations. See Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller, Civil Procedureat 465-69 (cited in note 1). Although a summary judgment is not the same as a dismissal (e.g., dismissal applies to the whole
claim while summary judgment may apply to all or to only a portion, dismissal is
for failure to state a valid claim while summary judgment implies the lack of any
genuine issue of fact requiring trial), I treat the two as functionally equivalent in this
paper.
10The evidentiary demands of the associated legal standard will often vary with the
expected costs of error. In view of this, this paper's thesis is equivalent to saying that
the pleading standard should vary with the ratio of false conviction to false acquittal
costs and the social costs of litigation.
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claims of fraud, which were difficult to prove and imposed substantial social costs beyond litigation expenses. The theory developed
here implies that the rigorous summary judgment standards that
have been developed recently by antitrust courts with respect to
predatory pricing, resale price maintenance, and conspiracy claims
based on parallel conduct should lead to a correspondingly rigorous
assessment at the pleading stage. This provides an economic ratio-2
nale for the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly,1
and suggests that it may have a broader application than to the circumstances of that case.
II. ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:
DISMISSALS AND PLEADING STANDARDS
In order to gain some economic intuition for the role of pleading
standards, we must first examine the function of dismissals in the
litigation process. In this section I briefly set out the standard model
of litigation and introduce dismissals into that model. The analysis
that follows will tie together several building-block models from
the literature on the economics of litigation. Since the models are
familiar in the literature, I will use numerical assumptions largely
instead of variable symbols representing factors of interest. The key
factors of interest (and the only ones represented by variable symbols
below) are the rate of compliance with the law and the average merit
of lawsuits.
A. Standard Model of Litigation
The standard economic model of litigation is a one period model that
focuses on the filing and settlement decisions. A suit is filed if the
expected judgment exceeds the cost of litigation. So, for example,
if the plaintiff thinks his likelihood of winning a judgment of $100
is 75%, he will file claim as long as his legal expenses are less than
$75. Formally, let P represent the plaintiff'spredictionof prevailing,
which is the plaintiff's prediction of the likelihood of a verdict in his
favor. Let the plaintiff's cost of litigation be $30 and the loss suffered
by the plaintiff (and the amount awarded if he wins his case) be $100.
A lawsuit will be filed, according to the standard model, when
"See Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller, Civil Procedure at 272-73 (cited in note 1)
(stating that the common law required fraud to be pleaded with specificity for various reasons, including the social cost of harm to the defendant's reputation); Charles
Clark, Code Pleading311-12 (2d ed 1947) (stating the same).
2
Bell Atlantic v Twombly, 127 S Ct 1955 (2007).

Keith N. Hylton

Pp($100) > $30.

43

(1)

Condition (1) says that a suit will be filed when the plaintiff's expected
judgment, which is the probability of victory multiplied by the damage award, exceeds his cost of litigation.
The factors that determine settlement in the standard model of
litigation are the parties' expectations of success at trial, their litigation costs, and the anticipated damage award. Let Pd equal the defendant's prediction of the likelihood of a verdict in the plaintiff's favor.
Let the defendant's cost of litigation be $30, the same as the plaintiff's. Settlement in the standard model is described by the "LandesPosner-Gould" condition,1 3 according to which settlement occurs if
and only if 14
(P

- Pd)$100

< $30

+ $30

(2)

In words, settlement occurs if the difference in the parties' expected
awards is less than the sum of litigation costs.'
B. Optimal Civil Procedure and the Role of Dismissals
The standard model of litigation does not incorporate dismissal of
lawsuits. In this part, I will augment the standard model to incorporate the dismissal decision. Determining whether society gains from
the dismissal or maintenance of a lawsuit requires some examination of the goal of civil procedure.
3
See William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J L & Econ 61
(1971); Richard A Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J Legal Stud 399 (1973); John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal
Conflicts, 2 J Legal Stud 279 (1971).
'4The Landes-Posner-Gould condition can be derived from a straightforward
consideration of the minimum a plaintiff is willing to accept in settlement and the
maximum that a defendant would be willing to pay in settlement. The minimum
a plaintiff would accept is the expected net gain from the suit: P v - c . The maximum the defendant will pay in settlement is his total expected cost from the lawsuit:
Pdv + c.. The parties have an incentive to settle, then, as long as P v - cF < Pdv + cd.
The Landes-Posner-Gould condition (2) follows directly from this inequality. In a more
complicated model that takes asymmetric information and strategic interactions into
account, the Landes-Posner-Gould condition no longer provides a complete explanation of settlement outcomes, see Keith N. Hylton, An Asymmetric Information
Model of Litigation, 22 Intl Rev L & Econ 153 (2002). For example, suppose plaintiffs
are uninformed and would find it unprofitable to sue an innocent defendant. if the
inequality in (2) is reversed, the outcome is one in which some guilty defendants
attempt to pool with innocents, and litigation occurs in some percentage of cases but
not all, see Hylton, 22 Intl Rev L & Econ (cited in note 14).
"This can be interpreted as a "bet" in which the difference in the stakes exceeds
the cost of the gamble, see Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal
Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 S Ct Econ Rev 209, 228 (2000).
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1. Specifying the Goal of Procedure
From a social welfare perspective, the goal of civil procedure should
be to encourage litigation only when it is socially desirable. Following Shavell,16 the social desirability of litigation can be determined
by comparing social costs when litigation occurs to social costs when
litigation is prohibited. 7 Let the probability of an injury when the
potential defendant/injurer does not comply with the law (e.g., does
not take care) be 3/4. Let the probability of an injury when the potential defendant does comply with the law (takes care) be 1/4. Let the
cost of compliance (e.g., cost of taking care) be $10. Finally, let the
variable w represent the percentageof potentialinjurerswho comply
with the law because of the threat of liability.8 For simplicity I will
assume that all injured victims file claims (i.e., condition (1) holds).
When lawsuits are prohibited, no one complies, so total social cost
is simply the expected harm caused by non-complying actors:
3100.

(3)

When lawsuits are permitted, the fraction of potential injurers that
comply is w, so social cost is determined by the harms caused by
compliers and non-compliers, their resultant litigation costs, and the
cost of compliance. Since the harms (and resultant litigation costs)
generated by compliers and non-compliers occur at the rate (1- w)
(3/4) + w( 1/4), total social cost under the regime in which lawsuits
are permitted is
-

w)31
)
+ w 1J]($l00 + $30 + $30) + w($10).

(4)

Suit is socially desirable, then, when social cost is lower in the regime
in which lawsuits are permitted. Comparing (3) and (4), litigation is
socially desirable when:
3

-

16Steven

j$100

-

$101 >

w31
w(l + w(!111($30 +$30).

(5)

Shavell, The Social versus the PrivateIncentive to Bring Suit in a Costly

Legal System, 11 J Legal Stud 333 (1982).
7
The approach that follows is based in part on Keith N. Hylton, The Influence of
Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under Strict Liability and Under Negligence, 10 Intl
Rev L & Econ 161, 165-66 (1990).
"8 This model is general enough to apply to intentional harms as well. For example,
in the antitrust setting, "the cost of compliance" could represent the profit forgone by
the dominant firm if it forbears from some anticompetitive act.
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This means that a suit is socially desirable when the expected
"deterrence benefits" (injuries avoided net of avoidance costs multiplied by the probability of compliance) exceed the total litigation costs. An ideal system of civil procedure rules would seek to
maximize the difference between deterrence benefits and litigation
costs. Equivalently, an ideal system would minimize the sum of
under-deterrence, over-deterrence, and litigation costs. Yet another
way of saying the same thing is that an ideal system would minimize
the sum of false-acquittal, false-conviction, and litigation costs.
It should be clear that this analysis implies that it might be socially
optimal to prohibit all litigation (reverse the inequality in (5)). That
would be equivalent to dismissing all lawsuits. But the question I
will examine here is whether there is a policy that discriminates
between lawsuits that should and should not be dismissed.
Finally, notice that the percentage of law compliers, w, plays an
important role in determining the social desirability of litigation.
Indeed, solving the inequality in (5), we arrive at the statement that
litigation is socially desirable, under the numerical assumptions, if
and only if the percentage of law compliers is greater than the fraction 9/14. This suggests that procedural rules that support compliance incentives can enhance the economic benefits provided by litigation.
2. Determining an Optimal Dismissal Rule
Given that the goal of an ideal system of procedure is to minimize
the sum of deterrence inefficiencies (under and over-deterrence) and
litigation costs, the question I consider here is how that goal can be
achieved through dismissal of lawsuits. Given the importance of the
compliance rate in determining the social desirability of litigation,
this will come down to choosing dismissal rules that support compliance incentives.
a. Merit of Claims and Social Costs of Litigation
The first step in linking dismissals to an optimal litigation procedure regime is to note that the percentage of potential injurers that
comply with the law should, in general, be a function of the merit of
lawsuits. Low merit lawsuits will target with equal or greater likelihood injurers who complied the law than injurers who did not. As
a result, low merit lawsuits will provide relatively weak incentives
for potential injurers to comply with the law. In general, the injurer's
incentive to comply depends on the difference between his expected
liability when he complies and when he does not. As this difference
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increases, the injurer's incentive to comply increases. Since the difference between the injurer's expected liability when he complies
and when he does not declines as the merit level of lawsuits declines,
so does the incentive to take care.' 9 This implies that the population
percentage of law-compliers (represented in this model by the variable w) is an increasing function of the merit of the typical lawsuit.
In addition, low-merit claims widen the difference between the
social and private gains from complying with the law. For litigation
to have the potential to improve welfare, the incremental liability
that results from failing to comply with the law should be at least as
great as the incremental cost to society that results from failing to
comply. However, if low merit lawsuits are capable of imposing substantial costs on defendants who complied with the law, the incremental liability for failing to comply may be miniscule. One way in
which low merit lawsuit may impose substantial costs on defendants
who complied with the law is if courts fail to use observable merit
proxies to distinguish low merit lawsuits and dismiss them early.
A numerical example may clarify these points. Suppose that an
injurer's failure to comply with the law imposes a cost of on a victim of $100 with certainty. If the injurer complies with the law, no
costs will be imposed on any victim. Suppose the injurer will be held
liable (with certainty) for $100 when he fails to comply. Suppose,
also, that the injurer will be liable, because of low-merit lawsuits, for
$80 when he complies (this amount reflects litigation expenses and
the expected value of an adverse judgment). Under these conditions,
the incremental liability that results from failing to take care is only
$20. It should be clear that this weakens the injurer's incentive to
comply in comparison to a system in which the incremental liability
is greater. Moreover, since the social cost of failing to comply is $100,
the injurer should-from society's perspective-spend up to $100 to
comply. But if the incremental liability is only $20, the injurer will
spend up to $20 for compliance and no more.
There is an important alternative result that has not been explicitly included in this model, but is worthy of mention here: low-merit
claims will affect activity choices of potential defendants. Faced with
the risk of being held liable whether or not he complies with the law,
a potential defendant may choose to avoid the activity that might
give rise to liability. This is an example of a type of over-deterrence.
For example, physicians who face the risk of low-merit malpractice
claims may choose not to practice in a specific high-risk area. 20 To the
"9Aformal model is presented in the appendix of this paper.
2°See Robert D. Cooter and Ariel Porat, Liability Externalities and Mandatory
Choices: Should Doctors Pay Less? 1 J of Tort Law art 2 (2006), online at http://www
.bepress.com/jtl/voll/issl/art2 (visited Apr 17, 2008).
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extent such litigation-induced decisions deprive society of the benefits of productive activity, low merit litigation is costly to society.
Thus, even if the final judgments issued by courts were perfectly
aligned with the merit of the claims that are litigated, a failure to
dismiss low merit claims leads to two types of social cost. First, by
permitting substantial litigation costs to be imposed on complying
defendants, failures to dismiss low merit claims weaken incentives
to comply with the law and to take socially desirable actions. Second,
by directly increasing total litigation costs, failure to dismiss low
merit claims reduces social welfare.
b. A Proxy for Merit
Since the plaintiff has the burden of proof, 2' the plaintiff's prediction
of prevailing, P , is a natural choice as an observable proxy for the
merit of his lawsuit. It is the plaintiff who must frame the case for the
court, and set forth the facts and legal theories that justify a judgment
in his favor. The plaintiff's work enables an objective observer to
assess the plaintiff's likelihood of victory, based on publicly available
information and that revealed by the plaintiff to support his claim.
Of course, the plaintiff's prediction of prevailing is assumed in this
analysis to22be based on objective evidence that can be demonstrated
to a court.
Admittedly, the defendant has the burden to plead defenses, and
these certainly have a substantial impact on the plaintiff's likelihood
of victory. However, the plaintiff will anticipate defenses and adjust
his prediction of prevailing to take their effect on the likely trial outcome into account. Given this, the plaintiff's prediction of prevailing, P , is the best candidate to serve as a measure of the merit of the
typical lawsuit.
The foregoing implies that there is a critical level of merit below
which lawsuits should be barred. Specifically, since the percentage of
law-compliers, w, is in general an increasing function of the merit of
the typical lawsuit, the percentage of law-compliers should increase
as the merit proxy P increases, and conversely. If the merit level falls to
the point at which the deterrence benefits are below the total costs
of litigation, social welfare could be enhanced by barring lawsuits.
In terms of the simple model presented earlier, if we allow P to be
the level of merit at which the deterrence benefit is just equal the
21For an economic justification for the allocation of the burden of proof, see Hay
and Spier, 25 J Legal Stud 413 (cited in note 8).
22If the plaintiff is rational, this is not a restrictive assumption. A rational plaintiff

will base his prediction of victory on the evidence that can be demonstrated to a court,
not on irrational prejudices or factual assertions that cannot be demonstrated (e.g.,
such as a belief that people who wear red shoes must always be guilty).
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total litigation costs (i.e., the left and right hand sides of (5) are equal),
suit should be dismissed whenever the plaintiff's prediction of prevailing is below the critical threshold P . When a plaintiff files a claim
that appears to fall below that critical level of merit, the court should
dismiss the claim.
Moreover, this argument implies that the critical merit threshold
will increase as the costs of false convictions rise relative to the costs
of false acquittals, and as the costs of litigation increase. In other
words, the threshold level of merit below which a lawsuit should be
barred increases with the ratio of false conviction to false acquittal
costs and the costs of litigation.
C. Multi-stage Litigation and Abusive Suits
As Baxter noted,2 3 the standard model fails to capture the multi-stage
nature of litigation. Litigation consists of several motions, some of
which (e.g., the dismissal motion) can put an end to the case, while
others alter its direction sharply.
The first model to show how the multi-stage nature of litigation
changes the results of the standard one-period approach is that of
Bebchuk.2 4 In the Bebchuk model, the multi-staged nature of litigation results in the prosecution of suits that appear to have a negative
expected value.
The key reason negative-expected-value suits are prosecuted in
the Bebchuk model is because early-stage litigation expenditures
become sunk costs as litigation progresses. 25 Thus, once a plaintiff has
reached a late stage of litigation, his incentive to continue depends
on the prospect of winning and the prospective (forward looking) cost
of litigation.
For example, suppose the cost of litigation to the plaintiff is $60
in each of two periods (the total cost to the plaintiff is $120). The
expected value of the judgment to the plaintiff is $100. This appears
to be a negative expected value suit. However, at the start of the
second period, the plaintiff's profit from continuing the litigation is
$40. Given this, the plaintiff has a credible threat of maintaining the
lawsuit after the first stage. Suppose, in view of that credible threat,
the defendant is willing to settle at the start of the second period
for $70. Given this settlement amount at the beginning of the sec23William Baxter, The PoliticalEconomy of Antitrust: PrincipalPaper 14-16 (Robert D. Tollison ed 1980).
24Lucian Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of
Threats to Sue, 25 J Legal Stud 1 (1996).
"Bebchuk, 25 J Legal Stud at 6 (cited in note 24).
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ond period, the plaintiff's threat to sue at the start of the first period
becomes credible.
One lesson from the Bebchuk model is that the multi-stage nature
of litigation can generate frivolous or abusive claims. For the present,
I will loosely define an abusive claim as one with such a low probability of victory on the merits that the plaintiff's primary purpose for
bringing the suit is to take advantage of the possibility of an erroneous decision in his favor.
D. Information and Sunk-Cost Effects in Litigation
In addition to the "sunk-cost" effect identified by the Bebchuk
model, multi-stage litigation also includes information effects.2 6 As
the litigants move from one stage to another, the information on the
plaintiff's probability of winning changes.
Consider a two-stage litigation model. The plaintiff's loss (and
damage award) is $100, the first period litigation costs are $30 for
both plaintiff and defendant, and the second period litigation costs
are $35 for both parties. Given that first period costs are sunk, at
the start of the second period the plaintiff's claim remains credible
if P 2($100) > $35. Again, given sunk costs, the parties will reach a
settlement if (PIp - P2)($100) < $35 + $35. Suppose that settlement
amount is S2. Following Bebchuk, suit will be filed at the beginning
of the first period if S2 > $30. Given that a credible suit will be filed
at the beginning of the first period, the defendant has an incentive to
settle at the same time. The settlement incentive for the defendant
will increase as the defendant's first period litigation cost increases.
These are straightforward implications of the Bebchuk model.
However, there is one difference between the case just explored
and the Bebchuk model. In this version, the plaintiff's probability of
victory changes over time. It is only the second stage probability of
victory that matters to the plaintiff's incentives to file. Thus, a plaintiff could file a suit with a virtually zero chance of victory based on
information available at the start of stage 1. Such a suit would appear
to be abusive in the sense loosely defined above.
This suggests a different approach to assessing abusiveness. Abusiveness should be determined based on information available at the
start of the second period of litigation. Thus, if the plaintiff's prediction of prevailing at the start of the second period, P1, is below some
critical threshold, the suit should be considered abusive, even if the
plaintiff's prediction of prevailing at the start of the suit, P', is above
that threshold. In a setting in which the likelihood of victory changes
d

2See

Bone, The Economics of Civil Procedureat 38 (cited in note 8).

50

The Economics of Pleading

over time, credibility should be determined by the prediction of victory at the final stage.
In addition, the notion of a positive-expected-value lawsuit
should also reflect the final period likelihood of victory, based on
information available at the start. The expected value of the judgment should be assessed on the basis of the end-period expectation
of the plaintiff's prediction of prevailing given information available at the start of the first period-in formal terms E(P1 P'). Thus,
if we consider the expected likelihood of victory at the end of the
second period, based on information available at the start of the
first, the lawsuit just examined has a positive expected value when
E(P21
> $30 + $35. Credibility, which should also be deP P)$100
P.
termined by the end-period expectation of victory, may exist even
when this positive-expected-value condition is not satisfiedY
E. Pleading Standards and Dismissal: Pleading Versus Summary
Judgment
In this part I will focus on dismissal in the multi-stage model. Assume
now that the first stage of litigation is the pleading stage, and the
beginning of the second stage is the summary judgment moment.
The analysis in this part builds on the preceding models and delivers
several rules for pleading-stage dismissals. 8
Let us now define an abusive suit as one in which the plaintiff's
prediction of prevailing at the start of the second period is below some
critical
threshold level. Formally, an abusive suit is one in which
2
P <T ,

(6)

where Tis the threshold level of merit below which a suit should
not be permitted to survive a motion for summary judgment. The
threshold merit level should be based on the objective of minimizing
social costs, 29 or, equivalently, on the goal of minimizing the sum of
false-acquittal, false-conviction, and litigation costs. It follows that
the threshold merit level should increase as litigation becomes less
productive as a deterrent and more costly to society.
The question examined in this section is the dismissal standard a
court should apply to the pleading stage. Given the merit threshold
27

Indeed, in the two period case just discussed, credibility exists when S2 > $30. S2
will be determined by final period predictions and costs. For example, if the defendant
moves first with a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer, his rational offer is S2 = P2($ 100)
- $35.
28
The reader who prefers to avoid the technical parts of the model may prefer to
skip directly to the four rules at the end of this part.
' 9See Part II.B.
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necessary at the summary judgment stage, a court should dismiss at
the pleading stage if

E(PP,

T)1

<

(7)

T,

where T is the additional information supporting the plaintiff's claim
that, based on objective evidence, appears likely to be introduced
into the trial during the first period (i.e., discovery). In other words,
if, given information available at the pleading stage, the expected
merit level of the lawsuit at the summary judgment stage is below
the threshold at which dismissal should occur, the plaintiff's lawsuit
should be dismissed at the pleading stage. Pleading stage dismissals
are socially desirable under this rule because they enable courts to
reduce overall social costs without having to further increase the
merit threshold. In plain terms, they permit courts to throw out some
bad claims early in order to permit more good claims to survive the
30
end-stage dismissal test.
To gain useful insights from the pleading stage dismissal criterion,
consider a case in which there are two merit levels possible at the
final (summary judgment) stage. One is the same level of merit at
the pleading stage, P1. This is the pessimistic scenario in which the
plaintiff finds nothing to enhance the merit of his claim after engaging in discovery. The other merit level is the discovery-enhanced
merit level t4,where q' > P1. Suppose the likelihood of reaching
the discovery-enhanced merit level 4' is a (i.e., using expression (7),
4= Ja, j}).
Since E(P21 P1, P) = atql + (1 - a) P1, a case should be dismissed at the pleading stage whenever
P
(Xt<- p"

P

(8)

This implies several rules for dismissal at the pleading stage.
1. Dismissalat the pleadingstageshould occur only in those cases
in which the claims and evidence asserted at the pleadingstage are
insufficient to meet the merit requirement at the summary judgment stage."

30

0ne might argue that some bad claims will get better if they are allowed to survive in court longer with more evidence coming in to support them. That possibility
is taken into account in the "discovery-enhancement" term 1I in expression (7). However, it is also possible that bad claims could get worse as more information enters. If,
for example, a jury is more likely to err once a certain type of evidence is put before
them-e.g., evidence that the plaintiff is a particularly sympathetic victim of bad
luck-then allowing a claim to survive beyond the first stage results in greater litigation1 costs and a potential reduction in the accuracy of the trial.
" In terms of the model, this is equivalent to requiring PI < T.
p
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2. Given that the pleadings are insufficient to meet the summary
judgment merit requirement,32 a claim should be allowed to pass the
pleading stage only if the discovery-enhanced merit level is unam33
biguously greaterthan the summary judgment merit requirement.
3. Again, assume the pleadings are insufficient to meet the summary judgment merit requirement.If the discovery-enhancedmerit
level is barely sufficient to satisfy the summary judgment merit
threshold, the plaintiff's pleadings must indicatethat it is virtually
certain that he will produce that enhanced
level of merit in order to
34
be allowed past the pleading stage.
4. Since the summary judgment merit requirement increases
with the social cost of the type of litigationinitiatedby the plaintiff,
pleading-stage dismissals should occur more often for more costly
claims. In particular, as the ratio of false conviction to false acquittal
costs increases, and as the costs associated with litigation increase,
dismissals should occur more frequently at the pleading stage. For
example, if the plaintiff's claim imposes relatively high costs on the
defendant, say by severely damaging his business or by imposing
exorbitant discovery costs, the threshold level of merit should be
correspondingly high.
This analysis of pleading-stage dismissal implies a surprisingly
stingy approach on the part of courts. In any case in which there is
considerable doubt as to whether the plaintiff will be able to survive summary judgment, because the potential quantum of evidence
in support of the plaintiff will at best approximate the minimum
needed to survive summary judgment, the courts should dismiss at
the pleading stage.
E. Circumstantial and Direct Evidence
To further explore the implications of this analysis of pleading-stage
dismissal, suppose the level of merit at the summary judgment phase
is a function of two types of evidence, circumstantial and direct. Circumstantial evidence, as the name implies, is evidence that creates a
strong inference in favor of the proposition it supports, while falling
short of direct support.3 5 For example, footprints of the same size as
32

That is, given PI <r.
terms, given that P1 < r, a claim should pass beyond the pleading stage

3In formal
if > T.

only

qi

In formal terms, where t, is only slightly greater than T, a must be close to one for
the3claim to be allowed beyond the pleading stage.
1See, for example, Dept of Econ Development v ArthurAndersen & Co. (U.S.A.),
924 F Supp 449, 474 (SDNY 1996) ("Circumstantial evidence is evidence that tends
to prove a disputed fact whose existence follows inferentially from the existence of

Keith N. Hylton

53

the defendant's provide circumstantial evidence that the defendant
was at the scene of an accident or a crime. Direct evidence, on the
other hand, is evidence that more or less demonstrates the proposition it supports. 36 For example, a videotape showing the defendant at
the scene of an accident or a crime provides direct evidence in support of the plaintiff's claim.
The foregoing analysis implies that the court's quickness to dismiss at the pleading stage, for any given summary judgment dismissal standard, should vary with the relative probabilities of direct
and circumstantial evidence entering the case. If the probability of
obtaining direct evidence is high, a court should be more willing to
allow the claim to proceed beyond the pleading stage. For example,
suppose the plaintiff is likely to obtain through discovery a document or eyewitness testimony that conclusively links the defendant
to an accident or a crime. This analysis suggests the court should be
relatively lenient in allowing such claims to pass the pleading stage.
On the other hand, if the likelihood of direct evidence is low, and
the level of merit likely to result from circumstantial evidence is just
below the level needed to meet the summary judgment threshold,
the court should dismiss at the pleading stage. Under these assumptions, the foregoing pleading-stage dismissal analysis implies that
the plaintiff should be almost certain to meet the circumstantial
evidence requirement at the summary judgment stage in order to
avoid dismissal at the pleading stage. However, if the plaintiff were
almost certain to avoid dismissal at the summary judgment stage, he
should be able to indicate that level of merit at the pleading stage.
Given this, a claim that fails to demonstrate that level of merit at the
pleading stage should be dismissed.
F. Facts and Law
The pleadings could be insufficient to meet the summary judgment
merit requirement on legal or factual grounds. The pleadings might
be insufficient on factual (evidence) grounds for several reasons. The
evidentiary facts .. ");Mark Reutlinger, Evidence: Essential Terms and Concepts
28 (Aspen 1996) (Circumstantial evidence is "Ielvidence that tends to prove a fact not
directly, but by proof of some intermediate fact, from which the fact ultimately to be
proved
can be inferred").
36
See, for example, Burell v Bd of Trustees of Georgia Military College, 125 F3d
1390, 1393 (MD Ga 1997) ("Direct evidence is evidence, which if believed, proves existence of fact in issue without inference or presumption.") (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Reutlinger, Evidence at 28 (cited in note 35) ("Direct evidence...
is evidence that tends to show the existence of a fact without the intervention of proof
of any other facts, or the need to draw any inferences from such intermediate facts.").
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plaintiff may fail to plead facts that are necessary to infer a violation
of the law. Alternatively, the plaintiff may have asserted facts that
could serve as circumstantial evidence of a violation, but the facts
may be insufficient in light of the summary judgment standard.
Under the predictive approach of this model, pleading facts necessary to infer a violation of the law should be a minimal requirement
at the pleading stage, in order to determine that the claim will satisfy the summary judgment threshold. For most legal claims, there
are facts that must be found in order to determine that a violation
has occurred. If a plaintiff fails to plead such facts, the court has no
basis on which to assess the likelihood that the plaintiff will satisfy
the summary judgment threshold. Consider the general differences
between negligent, intent-based, and conspiratorial tort claims. A
plaintiff in a negligence suit based on a car accident may fail to plead
any facts indicating substandard driving on the part of the defendant.
A plaintiff in an intentional tort suit may fail to plead facts indicating
deliberate conduct on the part of the defendant. A plaintiff in a conspiracy claim may fail to plead facts indicating that the defendants'
actions were not coincidental or independent. In each of these examples, the claim should be dismissed at the pleading stage because
it fails to meet minimal predictive requirements.
The pleadings might be insufficient on legal grounds for several
reasons. For example, the plaintiff might assert all of the relevant
facts and legal theories necessary to infer a violation of the law. However, the plaintiff may be mistaken on the law-as in the case of a
nuisance plaintiff who asserts a claim based on an interference with
3
his right to light and airy.
Alternatively, the plaintiff may assert a
detailed set of facts that fail to indicate by themselves a violation
of the law and without presenting legal theories that would allow a
court to predict whether there is a valid legal claim.
The approach of this model, which uses the summary judgment
standard as an anchor, is most useful for assessing evidentiary insufficiency at the pleading stage. Legal insufficiency is uncontroversial
as a basis for dismissing a claim at the pleading stage.
III. APPLICATION TO PLEADING LAW
This analysis suggests that there should be a close relationship
between the summary judgment dismissal standard and the pleading
stage dismissal standard. The summary judgment dismissal standard
is a function of the legal standard for liability and the facts offered to
37

See, for example, FontainebleauHotel Corp v Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc, 114
So 2d 357 (Fla App 1959).
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support the plaintiff's claim that the legal standard will be satisfied.
This has immediate implications for existing views on the proper
standard for dismissal at the pleading stage.
A. Liberal Versus Conservative Views of Pleading Requirements
On one hand there are liberal views, such as the "aggregate of operative facts" and "primary right" theories.3 8 Under the operative-facts
theory, proponents assert that plaintiffs should be able to pass the
pleading stage if they have asserted all of the facts that might lead
to a valid claim for liability, even if they have not linked those facts
to specific legal theories. 9 This view appears to be too liberal under
this paper's analysis because if the facts asserted fail to allow one to
predict what will happen at the summary judgment stage, then the
claim should be dismissed at the pleading stage.
The other liberal approach to pleading focuses on the primary right
of the plaintiff: for example, whether there has been a violation of the
plaintiff's right to exclusive use of his property.40 This approach also
appears to be too liberal. Asserting the violation of a primary right at
the pleading stage may not be enough to allow a court to predict the
outcome of a summary judgment motion.
The conservative position is the "theory of the pleadings" doctrine,
which requires the plaintiff to tailor his assertions at the pleading
stage to satisfy a specific legal theory. 4' This is closer to the approach
suggested by this paper. Of course, it might be too conservative, if
applied in a manner that does not take into account the possibility
that there could be more than one legal theory.
The standard suggested by this paper is a predictive test that asks
whether the facts and theories presented at the pleading stage are
likely, in light of the evidence that will enter, to satisfy the summary judgment requirements-where close calls are assessed in
light of the policies behind the summary judgment requirements.
This suggests that pleading stage requirements should vary with the
demands of summary judgment stage requirements. Certainly, specific legal theories will be required at the summary judgment stage,
as well as facts to support those legal theories. Where the summary
judgment standard is relatively high, in terms of the factual support
11Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller, CivilProcedureat 259-60 (cited in note 1). See also
Silas A Harris, What is a Cause of Action?, 16 Cal L Rev 459 (1928).
31Charles E. Clark, The Code Cause of Action, 33 Yale L J 817 (1923).
4°John Norton Pomeroy, Remedies and Remedial Rights by the Civil Action
According to the Reformed American Procedure460-61 (4th ed 1904).
41Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller, Civil Procedureat 261 (cited in note 1).
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required, the pleading stage requirements should be relatively high.
Conversely, where the summary judgment stage requirements are
relatively low, the courts should be liberal at the pleading stage.
Moreover, if courts erect a demanding summary judgment standard,
pleading stage claims
the implicit standard of proof applied to 4the
2
should also be demanding, and conversely.
This does not, at least in theory, lead to the "man-traps" that Bentham once complained had riddled the common law, 43 causing plaintiffs to lose valid claims because they had failed to assert some special
combination of words at the pleading stage. The theory implied here
suggests that an objective observer, presumably the court, should
attempt to forecast the legal theories and summary judgment standards associated with those theories. This approach would not penalize a plaintiff for failing to assert a claim that was clearly implied by
the facts set out in the pleadings.
B. Understanding the Law on Pleading
We can understand the law on pleading standards in light of the foregoing analysis. And by "the law," I refer to the way courts have dealt
with pleadings more than the particular rules set out in the civil
procedure codes. The procedural codes reflect broad judgments about
the desirability of litigation that may not be reflected in some of the
narrow, case-specific decisions on pleading."
Discrimination claims appear to have relatively light pleading
requirements. 4 This is consistent with the theory of this paper because
the summary judgment stage requirements are relatively low. At the
summary judgment stage, a discrimination plaintiff will either have
direct evidence or circumstantial evidence of discrimination.
42Suppose, for example, the courts have adopted a demanding summary judgment
test in response to a valid perception that false conviction costs are high relative to

false acquittal costs. It follows under this paper's approach that assessments of evidence should be influenced by the same policies behind the summary judgment standard. Thus, if false conviction costs are high relative to false acquittal costs, doubts
should be resolved against the plaintiff. Conversely, if false acquittal costs are high
to false conviction costs, doubts should be resolved against the defendant.
relative
43 Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries:A Criticism of William
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England 163-64 (Charles W. Everett ed,
1928).
14For a discussion of the conflict between the broad judgments behind procedural
code reform and case-specific decisions, see Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact
Pleading Under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,86 Colum L Rev 433 (1986).
4SSee Swierkiewicz v Sorema, 534 US 506 (2002); see also Michael Zimmer, The
New DiscriminationLaw: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas,
53 Emory L J 1887, 1933-1934 (2004).
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If the plaintiff has direct evidence of discrimination, such as a
memo in which an employer asserts a plan to discriminate against a
certain class of employees, he will most likely win his case and clearly
have enough to survive a summary judgment motion. Some courts
have defended the relatively low pleading threshold in discrimination cases on the basis of this possibility, but that is unpersuasive.
Direct evidence is unlikely to appear, and the prospect of discovering
it would provide a basis for allowing every claim to continue beyond
the pleading stage.
The more likely scenario is the case in which the plaintiff will
have only circumstantial evidence at the summary judgment stage.
However, the circumstantial evidence required in discrimination
cases is not particularly difficult to amass and relatively easy to interpret.4 6 For example, if the plaintiff can show that similar employees
not within the same protected class were treated differently (better)
by the employer, that may be sufficient to survive a summary judgment motion.
However, the discrimination claim is a relatively new species
within the population of legal claims. The best evidence to support
the theory of this paper is likely to be found in the common law treatment of pleading requirements. Two cases in which the common law
imposed special pleading requirements are fraud and defamation.
In the case of fraud, the common law required pleading of specific facts detailing the fraudulent act. 47 One justification typically
provided is that fraud amounts to an allegation of immorality.48 The
other traditional justification is that an allegation of fraud could
serve as the basis for avoiding contracts, deeds, and similar documents. 49 For example, a contracting party might refuse to pay after a
delivery of widgets. When the widget supplier sues for payment, the
purchaser could assert a claim of fraud against the supplier. Given
46

Zimmer argues that there are many "different types of evidence that can help form

the basis for a reasonable factfinder to draw [an] inference of discrimination" such as
unequal treatment, subjection to stereotyping, failure on the part of the employer to
follow its own policies, or statistical evidence regarding an employer's employment
policies and practices and their relation to diversity in the workplace. Zimmer, 53
Emory L J at 1934-37 (cited in note 45). In such cases "if there is sufficient evidence in
an individual discrimination case that would support a reasonable jury's decision to
draw an inference of discrimination, the defendant's motion [for summary judgment]
should be denied." Zimmer, 53 Emory L J at 1938 (cited in note 45).
4'Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller, Civil Procedureat 272 (cited in note 1). See also
Clark, Code Pleading at 311-12, 617 (cited in note 11); Joseph H. Koffler and Alison
Reppy, Common Law Pleading 194 (West Publishing Co1969).
48
Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller, Civil Procedure at 273 (cited in note 1); Clark,
Code Pleading at 311-12 (cited in note 11).
49
1Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller, Civil Procedureat 273 (cited in note 1).
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the potential damage to commerce if claims of this sort dragged on in
court without any serious effort to weed frivolous from valid charges,
the specificity requirement developed in the common law governing
fraud actions seems desirable.
In terms of this paper's theory, the specificity requirement adopted
under the common law for fraud actions is an example of courts raising the merit threshold in order: (1) to ensure that a claim admitted
into court was likely to meet the evidentiary requirements of the
legal standard and (2) to reduce the frequency of socially wasteful
litigation. As legal hornbooks note, the law imposed high evidentiary burdens on plaintiffs in fraud actions, requiring them to prove
misrepresentation of fact, knowledge of falsity, intent to deceive,
reliance, and substantial injury. 0 Where the legal standard imposes
a heavy burden on plaintiffs, the pleading standard should impose a
relatively high burden.
In addition to the difficulty of meeting the legal standard, the
social cost of fraud litigation provides another reason for imposing
a heightened pleading standard. There are several costs clearly connected to fraud claims. One is the cost of litigation, which is associated with any legal claim. Another is the reputation cost imposed on
the defendant. In markets in which reputation matters greatly, an
allegation of fraud could severely damage a business. And another
cost is the disruption in commerce. If courts refused to screen out
frivolous claims of fraud, businesses would find it more difficult to
enforce valid contracts, forcing them to rely on alternatives such as
long-term relationships or demanding property to be held as security.
The common law also required specificity in pleading for defamation actions.5 ' This is also consistent with this paper's analysis.
Here, the problem is not the burden imposed on the class of potential
defendants. In the case of defamation claims, as Holmes noted long
ago,12 society has an interest in making sure that they do not discourage speech. Defamation claims have had to meet relatively high
proof standards. The rigorous pleading standard is a reflection of the
relatively high proof standard and the perceived social cost of cheap
defamation litigation.
"°See, for example, Joseph M. Perillo, Calamari and Perillo on Contracts 333-46
(5th ed 2003).
"Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller, Civil Procedure at 299-300 (cited in note 1); see
also Clark, Code Pleading at 315-16 (cited in note 11); Koffler and Reppy, Common
Law Pleading at 195-96 (cited in note 47).
2
1 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr, The Common Law 138-40 (Little, Brown 1881).
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C. Pleading in Antitrust
Like discrimination claims, antitrust is also a relatively new area of
litigation. Because of its relatively recent birth, one cannot examine
the common law treatment of pleading in antitrust claims in order to
test whether the theory set out earlier in this paper provides a justificatory account of long-settled law. Moreover, the dismissal standards
at summary judgment and pleading stages are still in the process of
3
development in antitrust.1
Recognizing the social costs of false convictions, antitrust courts
have raised the evidentiary requirements to survive a summary
judgment motion with respect to many claims. Brooke Groupestablishes a recoupment test for predatory pricing claims that plaintiffs
54
find extremely difficult to satisfy at the summary judgment stage.
The courts have recognized the high costs of permitting erroneous
claims of predation to work their way all the way to a jury." The
resale-price-maintenance cases have established high proof standards for claims that reach the summary judgment stage. 6 Here
the law reflects the increasing recognition that resale price maintenance is not, as a general matter, socially harmful, and is in many
instances socially beneficial.5 7 The conspiracy case law has imposed
a "plus factors" requirement at the summary judgment stage that
requires plaintiffs to provide evidence suggesting that the defen-

S3For a recent independent analysis of antitrust dismissal standards that reaches
conclusions similar to those in this part, see Richard A. Epstein, AEI-Brookings
Joint Center Working Paper, Motions to Dismiss Antitrust Cases: Separating Fact
From Fantasy, available online at http://aei-brookings.org/ publications/abstract
.php?pid= 1059 (last visited Apr 18, 2008). On the general point that antitrust dismissal standards sometimes reflect general perceptions of the social costs of litigation,
see Stephen Calkins, EquilibratingTendencies in the Antitrust System, with Special
Attention to Summary Judgment and Motions to Dismiss, in L. White, ed, Private
Antitrust Litigation:New Evidence, New Learning 205 (MIT Press 1988).
14Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209 (1993).
"Matsushita Elec Indus Co v Zenith Radio, 475 US 574, 594 (1986) (internal citations omitted).
56
Monsanto Co v Spray-Rite Service Corp,465 US 752 (1984).
1 F.M. Scherer and David Ross, IndustrialMarket Structure and Economic Performance 548-58 (3d ed 1990). Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Law: Economic Theory &
Common Law Evolution 257-60 (2003); Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers
Want FairTrade? 3 J L & Econ 86 (Oct 1960); Victor Goldberg, The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricingand the Economics of Retailing Services, 79 Nw U L Rev 736
(1984); J.R. Gould and L.E. Preston, Resale Price Maintenance and Retail Outlets, 32
Economica 302 (1965); Patricia B. Reagan, Resale Price Maintenance:A Reexamination of the Outlet Hypothesis, 9 Res Law & Econ 1 (1986).
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dants' conduct could not be explained by independently-motivated
action.58
In many of these areas of antitrust litigation, courts have not
worked out precisely what should be required at the pleading stage.
In other words, summary judgment tests have imposed increasingly
high burdens on plaintiffs in antitrust, while pleading standards have
remained unclear in many jurisdictions. This opens the possibility
of high merit thresholds required at the summary judgment stage
coupled with low merit thresholds at the pleading stage.
One case in which this uncertainty was resolved is Bell Atlantic
v. Twombly. 9 The plaintiffs asserted that the incumbent "baby-bell"
telephone monopolies, also known as Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers (ILECs), conspired to: (1)prevent competitive local exchange
carriers (CLECs) from entering into their markets and competing
against them, as encouraged by access requirements of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and (2) avoid entering each other's markets
in order to compete.

60

The district court examined the plaintiff's complaint for evidence
that it was likely to satisfy the summary judgment standard, which
requires the provision of evidence of plus factors (evidence that the
alleged conspirators were acting against individual self-interest). The
district court found that all of the evidence asserted by the plaintiff's complaint was entirely consistent with individually-motivated
profit-seeking conduct. The district court dismissed the complaint
61
at the pleading stage.

The Second Circuit reversed on the ground that the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure do not impose heightened pleading standards for
antitrust claims. 62 The court noted that heightened standards exist
for fraud, mistake, and defamation claims; and asserted that outside
of those narrow categories all that is required is that the complaint
5
S5ee, for example, Ernest Gellhorn, William E, Kovacic, and Stephen Calkins,
Antitrust Law and Economics 277-82 (Thomson/West 5th ed 2004). For an alternative to the "plus factors" view, see Judge Posner's opinion in In re High FructoseCorn
Syrup Antitrust Litigation, 295 F 3d 651 (7th Cir 2002). Citing his view that Section
1 of the Sherman Act prohibits tacit collusion, Judge Posner would permit courts to
follow a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to assessing circumstantial evidence
at the summary judgment stage. One implication of this paper's analysis is that as
leniency programs bring in more direct evidence in conspiracy cases, fewer cases will
require an examination under the plus-factors test.
"'Bell Atlantic, 127 S Ct at 1955.
6°Id at 1962.
"'Tvwombly v Bell Atlantic Corp, 313 F Supp 2d 174 (SDNY 2003).
6 7Wombly v Bell Atlantic Corp, 425 F 3d 99, 112 (2d Cir 2005).
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be sufficient to give notice of the claims the plaintiff intends to prove
in court.6
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and held that
the federal procedure rules require allegations sufficient to raise the
"right to relief above the speculative level," 64 and that it was therefore necessary for the plaintiffs to provide evidence of plus factors at
6
the pleading stage. 1
This paper's theory supports the standard adopted by the Supreme
Court (and the district court). There are several reasons. First, the
merit threshold has already been set high for parallel action claims
at the summary judgment stage in order to reduce the frequency and
costs of false convictions. Failing to adjust the pleading standard is
inconsistent with this policy. Maintaining a low merit standard at
the pleading stage undermines the restrictive policy embodied in the
high summary judgment standard by encouraging the very lawsuits
that the high summary judgment standard aimed to discourage.
Second, a low pleading standard permits the plaintiff to impose
discovery costs on the defendants, which are generally understood
to be a heavy burden in antitrust cases. The discovery costs are large
enough to encourage defendants to settle claims even when the plaintiff's claim is highly likely to fail. In the case of a large class action for
treble damages, high discovery costs coupled with only a one percent
chance of victory at trial could force defendants to pay substantial
settlements.
What, precisely, are the false-conviction costs associated with
conspiracy claims based on circumstantial evidence? Suppose firms
in an oligopolistic industry are not colluding, but they have reduced
prices in parallel fashion (i.e., roughly simultaneous and similar
6 The Second Circuit reasoned that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "set forth a
pleading standard under which plaintiffs are required to give the defendant fair notice
of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Id at 107 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The court defined fair notice as "that which will
enable the adverse party to prepare for trial, allow the application of res judicata, and
identify the nature of the case so that it may be assigned the proper form of trial." Id at
108 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The Second Circuit then stated
that "the Supreme Court noted that it had previously declined to extend heightened
pleading requirements to other contexts beyond fraud or mistake. Id at 107 (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted) Thus, the Second Circuit found only the liberal
requirements of notice pleading must be satisfied in antitrust cases and "[t]o survive
a motion to dismiss ... an antitrust claimant must allege only the existence of a conspiracy and a sufficient supporting factual predicate on which the allegation is based."
Id at 114.
6Twombly, 127 S Ct at 1965.
6'
Id at 1965-66.
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conduct). A low proof standard for pleading encourages plaintiffs to
file suit whenever a case, however weak, can be made that harmful
price-fixing may have occurred. Realizing this, the potential defendant would be well advised to avoid increasing price in a parallel
fashion, since that would generate price-fixing claims. But if firms
are aware that lawsuits will follow parallel price increases, then they
will also know that it is risky to engage in price competition, since
upward price movements, which inevitably must occur if price competition is really vigorous, will be followed by lawsuits. The result is
that the litigation threat discourages the vigorous competition that
the law aims to encourage.
The third reason supporting the Court's decision requiring the
plaintiffs to present evidence at the pleading stage that indicates that
they will be able to satisfy the summary judgment standard is that
the best that they could hope for was to satisfy the summary judgment standard. Given this, the plaintiffs should have been required
to show that they are highly likely to satisfy that standard. The likelihood of finding direct evidence of a conspiracy is low, and would
require combing through warehouses full of internal documents.
There is no obvious upside to the proof that the plaintiffs might bring
in these cases, which distinguishes them from most employment
discrimination cases. In parallel-action conspiracy cases the standard
types of circumstantial evidence are insufficient to meet the summary judgment standard, while the standard types of circumstantial
evidence are sufficient in discrimination cases. Parallel-action conspiracy claims therefore depend heavily on the hope of finding direct
evidence, which is highly unlikely.
The pleading standard demanded by the Supreme Court in Twombly recognizes what common law courts have recognized for many
years; that pleading standards should be adjusted to take into account
the requirements of the legal standard and the social costs of litigation. Pleading standards for fraud were set relatively high under the
common law for these reasons. The economic model in this paper
suggests that pleading standards in antitrust should be shaped by the
same factors.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This paper applies a simple economic framework to the choice
between pleading and summary judgment as points at which a claim
can be dismissed. It concludes generally that pleading standards
should vary with the evidentiary demands of the associated legal
standards and the social costs of litigation. The common law's impo-
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sition of higher pleading standards for fraud claims is consistent with
this proposition. It also implies that the rigorous summary judgment
standards developed in antitrust courts with respect to claims of predation, resale price maintenance, and conspiracy should be paired
with rigorous pleading requirements.
Appendix
This appendix presents a more formal version of the core arguments
of the text. I will focus on the single-period litigation model here. The
results for the two-period model are straightforward extensions.
The model below puts a great deal of weight on the plaintiff's
prediction of success in a lawsuit. It assumes that this prediction is
based largely on case-specific facts rather than general information
about population compliance.
Standard Model of Litigation
The standard model of litigation is a one period model that focuses on the filing and settlement decisions. Let P equal the plaintiff's
prediction of success. A lawsuit will be filed when
P > ,YP,

(Al)

where y is the ratio of the plaintiff's litigation cost to the damage
award. ondition (Al) can be understood as saying that a suit will be
filed when the plaintiff's prediction of success exceeds the ratio of his
cost of litigation to his damages.
Let Pd equal the defendant's prediction of the likelihood of a verdict
in the plaintiff's favor. Settlement in the standard model is described
by the "Landes-Posner-Gould" condition, according to which settlement occurs if and only if
(P - P d) < Yp + _Yd

(A2)

Specifying the Goal of Procedure
Let 0,,, equal the probability of an injury when the potential defendant/injurer does not comply with the law (e.g., does not take care).
Let 0, equal the probability of an injury when the potential defendant
does comply with the law (takes care). Let x equal the cost of care
per dollar of damages. Assume x is a random variable distributed
according the cumulative distribution function G. Let w equal the
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percentage of potential injurers who take care because of the threat
of liability.
When lawsuits are prohibited, no one complies, so total social cost
(recall that the damage amount is equal to 1)is
(A3)

On

When lawsuits are permitted, the fraction w of potential injurers
comply, so social cost is
(1- w)On, + w(O, + x) + [(1- w)O, + w0O](-Yp + Yd)

Suit is socially desirable, then, when
w1(0 - 0J

-

x]> [(1- w)O

(A4)
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+ wO](yP + Yd)

(A5)

This means that a suit is socially desirable when the expected
deterrence benefits (injuries avoided net of avoidance costs) exceed
the expected litigation costs. Since yP , 0 , 0 , and x are fixed in this
model, procedural rules can impact the social benefit from litigation
most directly by supporting the compliance probability w. Specifically, (A5) implies that procedural rules should be structured to support a compliance equilibrium in which
W

>
On,0

0oc(A
(1 + Y)

x)'6)

where y - -y + _Yd (A6) defines a threshold level of w below which
lawsuits no longer enhance social welfare.
Determining an Optimal Dismissal Policy
The private incentive to comply is determined by a comparison of the
cost of compliance with the reduction in total liability that results
from compliance. Let r nc and re be the probability of being held liable
in the noncompliance and compliance states (respectively). Let snc
and s c be the share of the defendant's expense of litigating to judgment borne in the noncompliance and compliance states. The potential injurer will comply with the law if and only if
(Or

-

Or) + (O snc

-

OcSe)JYd > x,

(A7)

i.e., if the incremental liability of failing to comply exceeds the cost
of compliance.
Given that the cost of compliance x is distributed according to the
66See Shavell, 11 J Legal Stud 333 (cited in note 16); Hylton, 10 Intl Rev L & Econ
161 (cited in note 17).

Keith N. Hylton

65

distribution function G, the percentage of actors that comply with
the law is simply

w = G((O,,rn

- Ocr) + (Oncs

- OCsC)'Yd).

(A8)

Merit and Incentives to Comply

Here I will introduce the concept of merit in a lawsuit. Low merit
claims target the complying actors almost as severely as the noncomplying actors. Thus, the incremental liability for failing to comply falls as the merit of lawsuits falls. In terms of the model, this
means the ratios rncrc and sjs decline as the level of merit falls.
Let ffl = E(m) represent the expected level of merit in a lawsuit
and sn)s,
against a particular actor. From the foregoing, r ,r = f(=Af)
= h(Af), where f' > 0 and h' > 0. The percentage of actors that comply
with the law can be expressed as a function of the expected merit
level:

w = G(rjOncf(rl) -

O )

+

s (0 h(rfl) - O-0),

(A9)

which implies, as intuition would suggest, that w is an increasing
function of the merit level ((A9) implies aw/rla > 0).
The central claim of this model is that the plaintiff's prediction
of success serves as the best available proxy for merit. This implies
that the level of merit of a particular lawsuit is equal to the plaintiff's
prediction of success plus an error term: m = PP +E . It follows that
the fraction of actors who comply with the law can be expressed as

w=

G(ri0,(P)-

0) + s(O h(P) -

0)).

(A1O)

Because f and h are both increasing functions, the percentage of lawcompliers, w, is also an increasing function of the plaintiff's prediction of success. (A9) and (A6) together define a threshold level of
the plaintiff's prediction of success below which lawsuits should be
dismissed. That threshold level, PP, is defined as follows:
(All)
G(r(Of(P) - O) + s (eOh(P) - Oc )Yd
x)
(le o- o0(1 + Y)
Lawsuits for which P < P should be dismissed under an optimal
legal system. By dismissing lawsuits in which P is below the cut-off
level in (A10), courts maintain the expected level of merit, E(m), at a
level that supports incentives to comply.
P is determined by case-specific facts rather than general information about average compliance rates in the population. If P were determined entirely by the average compliance rate, we would have
the equality PP = 1- w, which would contradict the model pre-
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sented here. However, if the parties have case-specific facts that
allow them and courts to distinguish compliers and non-compliers,
P will no longer be determined by 1- w. Under this assumption,
dismissal of cases with low P is equivalent to dismissing cases in
which the plaintiff has failed to provide case-specific facts pointing
to liability.

